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DISTRIBUTED REFLECTION OF CAPABILITIES AS AN 
ASPECT OF INNOVATION 
Kristoffersen, Steinar, Faculty of Computer Sciences, Østfold University College,  
Halden N-1757, Norway, steinar.kristoffersen@hiof.no1 
Abstract 
Innovation is poorly understood. Generally, it is presented as a rational process of matching a 
brilliant idea with market needs via a sustainable business model. In business schools and 
entrepreneurial programs everywhere, future innovators are taught how to represent this stylized 
process in business plans. This approach is flawed inasmuch as it ignores the reflexive behaviour of 
the innovators themselves and the ways in which innovation and information systems development is 
shaped by that.  This paper instead shows how innovators work by maintaining and extending their 
innovability, rather than by promoting a particular innovation.  
Keywords: Innovation, Information systems development, telecommunications, mobile services. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
There seems to be no end to the failures of predicting the outcome of consumer-oriented 
telecommunications and service development2. The unexpected success of SMS3 has become iconic as 
one example of how difficult it is to understand what the market wants (Xu, Teo and Wang 2003). 
Similarly, actors in many European countries have found the success of i-mode in Japan hard to 
replicate4, and even to understand and describe consistently. WAP is currently undergoing a surprising 
renaissance after having been touted for many years as the most obvious failure of 
telecommunications5. With the massive amount of financing required to develop, deploy and upgrade 
the required infrastructure, as well as seeing the number of jobs at stake and the income connected to 
the usage of, for instance, mobile telephony, clearly we must have the ambition of understanding such 
processes much better.   
Our case is not a typical example of technology which concern innovation and diffusion theories.  
Usually, they are devoted to grander things: the diffusion of modern mathematics and the birth of the 
modern computer (Rogers 1962), pasteurization (Latour 1988), and electricity network architectures 
(Hughes 1983). In this perspective, innovations are usually seen as carrying global impact, in and by 
themselves (Hugill 2003). This paper, instead, covers the more regularly occurring innovation 
processes with which many entrepreneurial firms are inconspicuously involved, in order to examine 
exactly what makes them appear as innovative.  
The case in question is a comparably significant actor within the conception and development of 
innovative mobile services. We look at the co-ordination and implementation of a series of event 
within Multimedia.com6, a company which focus on various forms of mobile content distribution. Two 
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of its operations are described here: MultimediaContent.com, which is a content aggregator and Media 
Labs, who do streaming video.  
Multimedia.com was part of the massive growth in business related to the Internet and mobile content 
towards the end of the nineties, and they have already seen their share of ups and downs. The company 
was founded in 1993 as a small start-up with grand ambitions and only two owners, both of which 
were employees. At the time of writing the company has around 120 shareholders. In 1996, the focus 
was on Internet-technology, PC games, direct marketing and animation. At that time, they had many 
promising technologies which were patented or pending, but no real sources of income. Today, the 
company is successfully engaged in the aggregation and distribution of mobile content, none of which 
rely on their own original technologies.  
Thus, this paper is not about spectacular innovations. It is a presentation of one company’s activities, 
hand-in-hand with their ambitions to become innovative.  Innovation abated by market dissonance or 
reverse salients, which are deep-seated within the technological design itself (Hughes 1983),  do not 
stand out from our observations. Moreover, the services in question is perhaps too infotainment-
oriented and far-fetched for most users to be assessed by users in terms of perceived or experienced 
usability or usefulness (Davis, Bagozzi and Warshaw 1989). One might argue that acceptance of 
innovation need to build on an installed base (Ciborra and Hanseth 1998), or that technology in itself 
could be perceived as creating a disruptive momentum of its own by enabling a value proposition to 
fringe customers and early adopters (Christensen 1997).  
In this paper, we do not contradict any of the perspectives outlined above, as such. However, we do 
not find them sufficiently concerned with innovation in a scenario where there seems to be no existing 
base and no obviously unfulfilled needs, at least not in traditional or rational terms. In our case it does 
not seem suitable, as most innovation theorists seem to favour, to see innovative technology as the 
factor which alone makes a firm successful somehow. Indeed, the technology in question for our case 
is neither new nor particularly advanced. Rather, the success stems from many other factors, one of 
which is the set of activities with which the firm routinely engages to appear as innovative and thus 
facilitate a successful set of development trajectories for themselves.  
This paper therefore complements the existing body of research on innovation diffusion and adoption 
by looking at innovation from another perspective. We aim to be taking into account the practically 
achieved socio-technical co-ordination and continuous re-orientation between actors based on the 
opportunities that sporadically and arbitrarily arise, rather than looking at innovation as something 
essentially a property of the technology, or as a relationship between the market and the technology. 
Similarly, in this perspective, externalities are seen not as properties of an innovative technology (Katz 
and Shapiro 1985), they are much more aspects of ‘actively achieving innovativeness’ that companies 
orient their technological resources towards when they do the work that they need to do to become 
innovative.  
2 RESEARCH METHOD AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This paper is based on a study that was carried out in 2005. It started out with the objective of 
identifying the links between documentation practices, design and innovation. The company which we 
studied is involved in the development and aggregation of mobile content, as well as the technological 
development of platforms for games and messaging. Their primary customers are operators and 
“storefronts,” by which it is meant the actors who market and manage branded portals on the world-
wide web. It is not by international measures a very large corporation. They employed at the time of 
our investigation approximately a hundred people, of which half were software developers in an 
Eastern European country. The locally based operation is mainly occupied with sales and marketing, 
targeting customers all over the world and clearly just as successful in the US as in Europe, and even 
more so in East Asia. In East Asia, moreover, they have an outsourcing relationship (from the point-
of-view of their East-European subsidiary) going with a smaller development organization.  
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The case was selected for several reasons. Multimedia.com is one of the most successful companies in 
the country within the business of service provisioning. They are developing their own content, as well 
as aggregating from other developers, validating formats and platform adaptations, plus they have a 
wide range of subsidiaries. The firm has been through the highs of dot.com and survived the crash 
afterwards. Therefore it is representative of many types of companies, in content production as well as 
technical development and bigger as well as smaller enterprises. Moreover, the company is well 
known to the researchers involved in the project. They have always been supportive of research and 
without any strings attached they have allowed the examination of their archives and access to top-
level managers.  
The data collection for this paper by consisted of face-to-face interviews with all the central managers 
at various levels from CEO to consultant at the local site of the company, plus questionnaires. Some of 
the managers were interviewed twice. The interviews were structured by an interview guide, which 
aimed to bring about coverage of questions regarding the use of methods, documentation practices and 
innovation in the company. In addition, a study of the documentation produced and maintained 
throughout the life-cycle of all of the company’s projects in the period between 1999 and 2004 was 
carried out, of which two large projects in particular was analyzed in-depth. The interviews were 
recorded on mini-disc and documentation could freely be accessed from a dedicated user account set 
up for research purposes.  
It is important to emphasize that the aim of the interviews was not to perform a quantitative analysis or 
inductively generalize from the samples onto a more general model of innovation. Rather, the aim was 
to allow the actors’ own interpretations and documentation of their experiences with developing 
mobile services, to be subjected to interpretative analysis. This corresponds to the notion of 
interpretative research (Walsham 1995). To the extent that there is a consistent and stable pattern 
emerging, the hypothesis of the research reported here was that it might contest some of the classical 
tenets of more entrepreneurial innovation theories.  
Of course, the study still only concerns one organization and future work ought to include a broader 
sample in order to provide a stronger external validity. However, since the results reported here are not 
concerned with establishing correlations and relationship between observations emerging from the 
fieldwork. Therefore, the lack of statistical generalisability does not in itself invalidate the study as 
long as the case is representative, for which it was argued above on the background of the history and 
current market position of this company.   
The analytical framework of this paper is different from much of the previous work on innovation 
theories, which has taken a much more macro perspective. It is based on the participants’ own 
reflection, accounts and ‘shared-and-taken-for-granted’ knowledge of the situation. In this respect, it is 
also heavily influenced by ethnomethodology. However, the data collection in not based on participant 
observation which is usually seen as exactly the type of data needed to do an ethnomethodological 
analysis (Crabtree, Nichols, O'Brien, Rouncefield and Twidale 2000). The question (and perhaps 
objection), then, becomes naturally, is it possible to do an ethnomethodologically informed analysis 
based on a mix of interview-based approaches? There is support for our approach in (Garfinkel 2002), 
where it is stated that ethnomethodological analysis is not to be identified with a particular research 
methodology. Also, we refer to the rich variety of experimental approaches and interviews applied in 
ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967). 
It is important to bear in mind, then, that, participating in an interview (or responding to a 
questionnaire) in itself can be seen, of course, as an everyday, locally situated and accountable 
activity, from which we can learn, ethnomethodologically speaking, just as much or more about what 
people do in those particular settings, as one can learn about their work. This is not an attempt to 
promote a naïve punch-line along the lines that people do not say exactly what they mean when they 
are interviewed or respond to web-based questionnaire (although that is probably the case as well, 
from time to time). It means that utterances by the subject in an interview rather than being treated as a 
positive imprint of the external world could be seen as data in itself, as indeed is the case for this 
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paper, and subjected to a reflexive analysis (Walsham 1995). The research presented here is based on a 
single case. That is a limitation, but it does not, for the reasons just given, invalidate it in 
methodological terms.  
3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF INNOVATION 
Innovation theory is a large area with rich and useful contributions of theory as well as case studies. It 
is impossible to cover the area entirely and justly in a conference paper such as this, and the brief 
summary of some of best-known contributions which follows is bound to be found lacking by some 
readers. This does not mean that we take theory lightly. Innovation theory usually set the criteria 
firmly for what is to be considered the making of novel technologies and corresponding change of the 
state-of-affairs in society. Management structures and competencies influenced thereby, interact with 
technological systems development in a heterogeneous engineering process (Law 1987). In this 
perspective, a theory of innovation itself becomes part of innovation.  
A groundbreaking theory of technological innovation and its adoption into a market was introduced in 
the early sixties by Rogers (1962). He created a topology of adopters of any new idea or invention, 
according to which, members of a market could then be described either as innovators, early adopters, 
early majority, late majority and laggards, roughly around a normal distribution.  Rogers (together 
with Kincaid) have also made more recent contributions to the design of social research, in particular 
pertaining to communication networks and their influence on human behaviour (Rogers and Kincaid 
1981). It can be seen as representing a market perspective. As such it is concerned primarily with how 
the individual consumer’s perception of innovation will facilitate the adoption of a new idea.  
Other models take a similar point of view, such as the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis, 
Bagozzi and Warshaw 1989) and others in the same tradition such as the Unified Theory of 
Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT)  (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis and Davis 2003). TAM was 
constructed to be used to predict the acceptance and usage of IS in organizations. This model 
hypothesizes that perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use are fundamental determinants of user 
acceptance. There are a number of studies which confirm this hypothesis, with perceived usefulness 
appearing to be the dominant factor. In the original work on TAM, Davis (1989) indicated that of this 
pair, perceived usefulness could be an antecedent factor which, in its turn, influenced the other.  
Thomas P. Hughes talks about the development of large technological systems which evolve in 
accordance with a loosely defined pattern. Implicitly, the theory of large systems innovation, thus, 
concerns systems which evolve, or expand, in “phases in which the activity named predominates: 
invention, development, innovation, transfer and growth, competition and consolidation (Hughes 
1987)”.  One core concept in Hughes’s theory is that of a “reverse salient”.  A salient is a protuberance 
in a line which separates one advancing phenomenon from one that retracts due to those 
advancements. Hughes uses a weather front or the surf of a wave as an example. A reverse salient, 
then, is a point on the line of advancement where the opposition is still stronger and  core components 
of the new system are lagging or out of phase with the rest of the related technology (Hughes 1987). 
The examples given by Hughes are technological, typically ones of changing specifications or 
performances on behalf of one component necessitates changes in others. A reverse salient induces 
change. It can either be improved within the context of the existing system, or it represents an entirely 
new opportunity for radical change by a new system emerging.  
The notion of disruptive technology has most noticeably been attributed to Christensen (1997). It 
describes a product or service that eventually take the dominant position in the market from an 
incumbent, despite being unusual and underperforming compared to existing solutions. It might also 
be serving customers who have not previously been targeted by the dominant provider for instance by 
not needing the volume or being able to afford to mandatory service agreements. Since technology 
developments regularly take place at a much faster rate than customer requirements develop, even 
from such a marginal niche the innovator can then move upward and take greater market shares as the 
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technology improves and prices are reduced. Due to their installed base of profitable customers and 
organizational culture, the leading actors will not be willing to aim for radical innovations in the first 
place, nor will they be able to change fast enough to compete once their position has been overtaken. 
Ideas of a disruptive technology might seem heavily technology deterministic, but in later works, 
Christensen et al.  (2004) turn slightly toward the development strategies of disruptive innovation 
instead, agreeing that few technologies (according to this modified theory) are essentially disruptive or 
sustaining as such. The disruptive impacts of new innovation are equally a consequence, for instance, 
of infrastructure, market orientation and the implementation of product plans. 
For many technologies, the net benefit of adoption increases with the number of adopters (Katz and 
Shapiro 1985). It may directly influence the perceived and experienced usefulness and quality of the 
product, such as in the telling example of the telephone, which depends (clearly) on the number of 
subscribers that exist in the network. More indirectly, the number of adopters of a certain enabling 
platform will, in the next instance, influence the quality and number of the applications that it is 
targeted by. The hardware-software paradigm is often used as an example, illustrated well by the 
width and depth of programs that are available for the most popular platforms, such as the Intel-based 
PC. Another externality that arises from the numbers of consumers and users) is the calibration of the 
service network, which typically will improve in coverage with the number of customers that 
indirectly or directly contribute to funding it.  Mainstream innovation theories and diffusion models 
seem to be concerned mainly with the relationship between the individual or group of users and the 
technology (see Figure 1). It sees the technology as an object to be promoted towards adoption. It sees 
the market has hosting the needs of users. The challenge is to identify and manage the fit, or align 
needs with technologies.  
 
Figure 1: Common theories of innovation all fit in a perspective of innovation as external to 
technology and technology as external to the market needs 
To some extent, one finds that many theories of innovation are mainly concerned with technology, 
leaning amicably towards a technological determinism perspective taking the stance that essential 
qualities of technology will to a significant degree influence the adoption. Others look at the user on 
an individual level mainly, departing from ideas of usefulness and usability to predict adoption (for 
instance TAM). The theories of network externalities look at the relationship between users and the 
installed base from the opposite direction of disruptive technologies (and, indeed, from technological 
determinism).  It sees adoption partly depending on successful adoption itself, in a cycle of increasing 
returns from a growing number of users. Thus, good technology can fail for social reasons. Hughes 
(1987) does not dismiss such socially induced reverse salients. However, in his theory of large-scale 
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systems innovation, the innovators’ many roles are construed as concerned with improving, evolving 
and sponsoring particular technologies (rather than adoption). In other words, the roles, competencies, 
the organization of work and co-ordination of enterprises, etc, are subject to the needs of the 
technology and it is the technology that advances in salients rather than the other way around. This is, 
indeed, an intuitive and rational common denominator for the conceptualization of innovation. But is 
this how it really takes place, and can it proactively be supported in this fashion? In this paper we offer 
an alternative perspective. We believe that there is a need to investigate innovation from a broader 
perspective, including reflexively the innovator as an actor in the heterogeneous network of 
innovations that we study, rather as seeing the innovator as outside and above the actor-network which 
constitutes the technology that is at the core of the innovation endeavour.   Moreover, the conceptual 
distinction between provider and adopter of technology seems simplified and influenced 
(understandably perhaps) by large-scale success or failure stories related to consumer products. But of 
course, innovators of technology are also users of those very same (and related) technologies. Before 
we go into the detailed model, we will describe a case providing the background and rationale for our 
alternative conceptualization of “innovation work” along these lines. The next part of the paper 
describes the practical involvement of a company in a process which we see them as working to 
become innovators, rather than innovators at work.  
4 THE MOBILE MULTIMEDIA CASE STUDY  
We now turn to our case. Multiemedia.com has today a going operation that arguably must be 
considered a reasonably successful business venture of mobile content provisioning. This is not where 
it started. From the beginning in 1993, this company was much more modestly engaged in developing 
simple games and direct marketing strategies for the Internet. The firm had many seemingly unrelated 
ideas for technologically-founded breakthroughs, some of which were quite appropriately timed.  For 
instance, they were engaged in making an Internet browser entirely in Java, a search engine (this was 
before Google and Fast), an MP3-player, advertising software, etc., but they never really managed to 
get anywhere with these projects, mainly due to a lack of funding, according to the owners. 
These entrepreneurs originally came from a background in the film industry, and had been doing 
production work in Hollywood and Oslo, when they were given the opportunity to do the modelling 
and special effects for a cartoon feature film, which became a nice hit in Norway. They got themselves 
a name in the press and then came along dot.com with a much more viable source of funding for 
research-based development. With UMTS7 on the drawing board and the PDA8 on the face of it finally 
getting ready for prime time, the timing was good and Multimedia.com had exactly the right 
technology.  
Already working with cartoons had set up Multimedia.com to work with modelling in 3D through one 
of the firm’s subsidiaries.  Talking heads a la Max Headroom, which became a generation icon for 
many, had by now come and gone from the TV-sets and the PC was, de-facto, a full-fledged 
multimedia terminal with proper video already. The mobile phone, on the other hand, had neither the 
bandwidth nor the processing power to do that.  Multimedia.com had developed a technique to 
animate a model of a human being locally using their own algorithm library for 3D-rendering, and 
they thought they could do it with the CPUs of next generation telephones. They made such talking 
heads move their lips and cheeks by extrapolating mouth and head movements between vowel 
instructions. Thus, it was extremely gentle on bandwidth compared to the competition, which relied on 
transferring the compressed frames. The ambition of Multimedia.com in 1999 was therefore to deliver 
a personal broadcast, end-to-end, across the mobile network.   
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By 1999, they had been trying for a while to get the attention of possible customer for this product; in 
particular the founders saw that a market was developing in the centre of Scandinavian mobile 
telephony development at the time, Kista outside Stockholm in Sweden. They were actively seeking 
out opportunities with the business developers and project managers at Ericsson. They found a great 
environment for it in a handheld terminal division working to develop a 32-bit EPOC-based 
smartphone with an Arm 9 CPU.  Ericsson needed a conceptual demonstrator to show off it 
capabilities. The engineers and consultants at Multimedia.com interacted deeply with Ericsson 
Research and Development in Kista as well as in Chapel Hill. Finally, they agreed to create an 
interactive news application, with four updates a day of BBC news, with a talking head as the anchor 
men or -women. At CeBit six months later, they had it running on the mobile device.  
Soon later, they found themselves in the midst of the heated attention of dot.com. Approximately 250 
people were in their employment in offices around the world. The firm was working closely with some 
of the big players in the industry such as Ericsson, Intel and BBC. The technology was all new and 
patented or pending as well. The firm had developed 3D animation for mobile handsets. 
Unfortunately, Ericsson never managed to get their smartphone into the shops, and their project was 
abandoned. The focus of operators for a while turned to WAP. WAP was seen as one way of getting a 
standard client platform out there which would not tie operators to proprietary solutions such as 
Multimedia.com’s. Multimedia.com had to prove that their solution could stand on its own two feet. 
They got their hands on a large batch of a model called the R380 and they went into a pilot with a 
really limited version of their news application. The market did not respond favourable, however, it 
seemed. This coincided roughly with the big dot.com crash of course; dwarfed again by 9/11 one year 
later and it effectively put a stop to Multimedia.com’s expansion. The end of fresh venture capital was 
a problem of course, but not the only one, and in this case, not the significant one. Multimedia.com 
continued developing their talking head application and eventually got a quite nice one out on IPAQ 
PDA, with regular news production from a studio abroad, based on news from ITV9. However, it was 
still no big hit, for a number of reasons. The terminals sold in relatively small numbers and the people 
who used the devices did not subscribe to the service. News is relatively easily available worldwide 
from a number of sources which hold high and unique editorial qualities. Mobilemedia.com was a 
start-up and an incubator, not journalists, and they failed to get unique content out quickly and cheaply 
enough. In their case and in this business, technology simply did not seem to be sufficiently much of a 
differentiator. By now, however, the company had set up operations in London, Preston, Colombo, 
Hong Kong and Beijing in addition to Romania.  They were by now a large number of handsomely 
paid people working in multiple locations and although there was probably nothing wrong with neither 
their ideas nor their battle plans, it slowly came to a halt.  
Multimedia.com started looking for new opportunities and ended up for a while producing and 
deploying consumer oriented content to mobile phones: logos, ring tones and games. This activity 
mainly came out of a subsidiary MultimediaContent.com Ltd, which had (and are still mainly in the 
business of managing) distribution agreements with several operators and storefronts on the web 
worldwide (Norway, China, Italy, Hungary, etc.). Over 100 content providers have entered into signed 
agreements with MultimediaContent.com Ltd, and they also signed an exclusive five year commercial 
agreement with one of the larger divisions of a Chinese operator to provide premium SMS and data 
services. MultimediaContent.com developed a technology-independent platform for mobile content 
management, provisioning and distribution, based on experiences from another subsidiary of 
Multimedia.com, DigitalMobility.com Ltd, which they bought a few months earlier when that firm 
effectively went bankrupt trying to do this on their own.  
The technology involved is really simple, but the business is risky. No-one knows in advance exactly 
which applications (ring tones, games, logos, etc.) will bring in enough money to defend development 
costs (and recover sunk costs for failed attempts). When the first-movers successfully established 




themselves in this business, the costs of development were lower; there was less competition and the 
consumers were less demanding. Now, one must look at the co-ordination between actors in this 
setting from a different angle, for instance, as parts of a political and tactical positioning towards a 
more mature market. The actors need to do continuous practical alignment with other firms in the 
business segment, since the competencies and access rights that are required to implement an end-to-
end service is not readily available to anybody. This is to a large extent due to the telecommunications 
infrastructure operators’ stronghold on the network and billing for services. The companies with an 
ambition to become innovators in this area do not only have to invent and re-invent technologies, they 
need to implement risk management (and risk sharing) strategies, since succeeding with a end-to-end 
service requires a much greater investment than what each party can afford individually (given that 
they do not know in advance what exactly will become a success in the market), etc. Therefore, co-
ordination in the commercial context of this case is a lot more involved and intricate than it used to be. 
It does the work of orchestrating many small contributions into a larger offering that the market, in 
sum, just might end up paying enough for. Multimedia.com might not have been successful in this 
endeavour at all, in this sense, had it not been exactly because they for much too long had been 
struggling to make ends meet in this market.  
Towards the end of 2003 the outlook was still quite sinister, and a venture company with links to the 
biggest national operator acquired control (for all practical purposes) of the company in a placement of 
€425 000 for one third of the company. The purchase was, arguably, part of a defensive strategy on the 
operator’s behalf of gathering all of its new media involvements under one venture investment 
administration. At the same time, the venture company independently also made further investments 
along the lines of a more aggressive “roll-in and consolidate” strategy, seeing reasonably priced 
opportunities in a sombre market.  
In the summer of 2005, Multimedia.com reached their objectives from the initiation of their great 
expansion, not by successfully developing their own animation technology until it reached production 
quality, but by buying a small company that we shall call Media Labs, which, for a while and quite 
successfully, had promoted their streaming video solution in the mobile phone market. The money to 
buy this company came from their new owner, the operator’s former venture department. Media Labs 
is a small spin-off from the national broadcaster NB10. NB had been experimenting with 
complimentary services to their TV-shows since the beginning of this technology, first on the web and 
more recently oriented towards ubiquitous computing and mobile telephony. It could, however, not 
easily be integrated into their government-funded, public license-based operation, so the engineers left 
to set up this company.   
5 INNOVATION AS DISTRIBUTED CAPABILITY REFLECTION  
It seems from our case that ordinary and haphazard innovation is not uncommon, as it ‘happens to’ a 
lot of companies. It then becomes pertinent to ask what we can learn from it. It does not seem that the 
theories most commonly applied to innovation processes would have matched our case very well.  
Especially, the notion that first a technological invention comes along, and then the actors assume 
roles and take the measures that are necessary to turn that invention into a successful product, does not 
seem to be entirely general. Our case instead indicates that invention is sometimes the main ambition 
of some actors, who then ‘achieve it’ almost regardless of the technology. Technology as such plays a 
role, of course, albeit not in technical terms and certainly not in technology-deterministic fashions. It 
is, rather, a resource that is drawn upon to feed a more general set of visions. Eventually, such visions 
is of course realized using “technology in technical terms,” but the selection and development thereof 
is subject to so many other aspects of “being entrepreneurial.” There is great fascination in our society 
with innovation and technology. In some sense, a permanent disclaimer seems to be needed, since 
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quite strong arguments are made about the ability of technology as a change agent (Malone 2004). Our 
stories show that technology plays a more modest role, without of course being entirely powerless in 
terms of implicating change. Most importantly, however, and perhaps in an interesting contrast to the 
perspectives outlined above, much of the technology that is involved in innovation processes is deeply 
underutilized. Sometimes it is, indeed, only a solution looking for a problem, but describing it simply 
as that glosses to a large extent the practices involved in defining and implementing a product as 
something that goes beyond technology. Not everything that people want is about solving problems, 
after all. But what we seem to find is that great technological potential and nice ideas about how to use 
it in applications are put to the side, in order for actors to push forward and pursue status as 
sufficiently innovative to make money instead of developing the technology further.  
The core, we believe, of many of our findings is that organizations as and when they develop 
technology, not only redefine themselves in terms of the technology and the opportunities that it 
offers, until they find a fitting role that can contribute to getting the technology launched, as it were, 
but also the other way around. In light of their ambitions, as and when they develop themselves, they 
redefine their ‘innovation’ in terms of candidate technologies and the opportunities that they offer, 
until they find a matching set. This is what we mean by distributed reflection of capabilities, as 
illustrated in Figure 2 below.  
.  
Figure 2: A reflexive view of capabilities means that the actors are using the view of themselves 
together with actor-resources, as input for the next iteration of innovation 
The “wannabe-innovators” reflexively analyze their capabilities and look for a match with the 
observable patterns of similar or related innovatively-oriented activities by actors in their environment. 
The technologies that they know are actor-resources. Other actors are actor-reserves, and they 
themselves are actor-resources. Actor-resources are strung chronologically together by the actions that 
they take and choices that they make. Putting it all but too bluntly, what the organization can do with 
what it has is a continuous “corporate re-reflection of self” which is matched against possible courses 
of action with known actor-resources within and in the environment. In this perspective, innovation is 
pattern-matching and a match of patterns means that the library of temples in the reflection of 
capabilities can be adapted and improved. For Multimedia.com this entailed redefining their role from 
a technology incubator to an agent, from which the operators and storefronts could get a broad and 
proven collection of logos and ring tones and java games and eventually, videos that they could offer 
to their customers. It meant maintaining a certain and distinct path “independency” when it came to 
the roles that they assumed, of course, as well as the technology. In doing this, they also had to realize 
that success could not come from making a radically new invention, a disruptive technology that 
would deconstruct and reconstruct the value chain. Instead they had to reinvent themselves to be a 
much more modest contributor to the status quo.  
Doing empirical studies of innovation processes seems necessary to understand the ways in which the 
very notion of innovation glosses achievements that are not particularly novel and technologies that 
are not particularly ingenious. This does not make their position less interesting or profitable, nor does 
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it imply that these technologies have any less impact. This paper indicates, just as interestingly we 
think, that one needs to look at precisely when and why a set of activities in technology and business 
development is nominated as exactly innovations in order to understand how they came about as such. 
It is “lock, stock and barrel” of successfully becoming an innovator’.  
6 DISCUSSION 
The traditional way of teaching entrepreneurship departs from the idea of a great idea, i.e., that there is 
a problem for which a technical solution has already been identified and that the technical solution 
needs to be sufficiently refined, adapted and strategically launched into its righteous slot in the market. 
Instead we maintain that innovation often happens through “the idea of having a great idea“. 
The largest body of research in innovation theory has started from the perspective of innovation as a 
property of the technology that is being promoted. This can perhaps be seen most clearly in the early 
publications from Christensen on disruptive technologies (Christensen 1997; Christensen and Raynor 
2003), and although the later works from the same research group include the much-needed notion of 
choice in their predictive framework (Christensen, Roth and Anthony 2004), this choice is still 
strategic and rational. This research reported in this paper has on the other side shown that it counts 
just as much who you know and the resources that you acquire, and that the micro-level history of past 
performances in individual project count towards setting the stage for innovation to emerge.  There are 
some alternative approaches presented in recent literature. Similarly to this paper, MacInnes et al. look 
at innovation as a transformation of the industry (MacInnes, Moneta, Caraballo and Sarni 2002). Their 
research is much more oriented towards the strategic choices of network providers in order to leverage 
their profits, however, whilst this paper has emphasized the ad-hoc choices within mobile services 
provision. Although both sets of processes need to lead to improved coordination between the actors, 
MacInnes et al. definitely see a more rational unfolding of events than what has been presented in this 
paper. This can bee seen clearly in the case of Multimedia.com, who have been striving to become 
entrepreneurial since their origin, and, when they finally reached that goal, it came through two 
inventions that were completely in-sourced. They bought the content management platform from 
another dot.com almost gone bust, and the video streaming platform they acquired from a spin-off 
from NB.  
The position that innovation is man-made, not only from technology, but also from the appropriation 
of competencies and relationships, history and a good deal of luck, might seem too obvious, but the 
point that we are trying to make here goes a little bit further. It is not just that good products can fail 
(Norman 1998), but the “goodness” of a product might simply not be all that relevant, compared to its 
non-functional qualities, availability, marketability and the fit in an ecology of actors which co-
ordinate their everyday business to the needs of those just-now-managing that particular “technology”. 
Castells has written very nicely about the new economy and e-business based on the Internet, and just 
like the Internet affords “scalability, interactivity, management of flexibility, branding and 
customization in a networked business world (Castells 2001)” so does the next generation of cellular 
networks. But the contribution of this paper is also to show that such properties emerge from the co-
ownership, and co-ordination of firms, rather than as essential properties of the technology. It 
constitutes an innovation infrastructure, rather than a technical one. Such networks of innovation have 
been made the subject of studies as elsewhere as well, for instance by Maitland et al. (2005), who 
found that the rapid change in the telecommunications sector is causing change, for instance by 
increasing the interdependence of its firms. It is in line with our research when they come to the 
conclusion that the revenue sharing mechanisms and governance become less standardized as the 
relationship between providers and consumers become less tightly coupled. At Multimedia.com, 
national standardization was seen as making life easier for their product development departments, at 
the same time as the strong co-ordination activities and flexibility of the company made it possible for 
them to integrate content across standards. On the other hand, Maitland et al claim that the revenue 
model and nature of network membership will shape the service network (Maitland, Van De Kar, De 
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Montalvo and Bouwman 2005), and the opposite seems to be the case for our research. 
Multimedia.com maintain a homogeneous service network across their partners and subsidiaries, even 
with the same technological platforms implementing it, even across national and regulatory border 
which implicate very different business models.   
There is a greater achievement in integrating business models across such boundaries, than we might 
think at first glance. Haaker et al. look at the business model as “[…] a blueprint for how a network of 
organizations co-operates in creating and capturing value from new (…) services and products. 
Designing business models is a complex issue (Haaker, Faber and Bouwman 2004).“ From the 
research that we have reported in this paper, it seems natural to add that business models are so much 
more, in one sense, inasmuch as they need to cover co-ordination aspects beyond services, technology, 
organization and finance, which are also the domains that are recommended by Haaker et al (2004). 
Conversely, it seems reasonable to claim that business models are at the same time “much less,” since 
they do not seem to be designed as such, and should be thought of as blueprints for a business only to 
the extent that they document a process of continuous and opportune co-ordination with regards to 
such external factors and resources. It could be argued that the conception of a business model does 
not fit the external factors and resources represented by the historic structures of previous projects, 
mergers between form and technological arrangements made simply to make the application work 
across a multitude of handset. On the other hand, it is hardly possible to see innovation of the business 
without a glance toward such factors, and it would therefore in future research be tempting to try to 
apply the resource dependence perspective of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). It is a seminal work which 
points toward including, amongst other factors, political lobbying and social influence as well as 
merger within and without the firms own control in an analysis such as this. It offers a detailed 
argumentation about the role of information in the dynamics involving a firm and the external forces 
that it has to deal with. It is a future ambition of the work presented here to present a more detailed 
view of external factors influencing ex-technology innovation, than can be found in most 
entrepreneurial literature on this topic. Keeping in line with the ethnomethodological ambition of this 
paper, it is not the point that there are external factors which influence the firm; rather it is how they 
are dealt with, in this instance, by actors in such a way that it makes them innovative.  
This paper indicates the non-linear nature of such ordinary and practical innovation as and when it 
comes out of as well as necessitates co-ordination.  It explicates ordinary processes leading to 
extraordinary results, and show how a network of innovation-oriented actors thus recalibrate and 
reorient their work to adapt in a non-linear fashion to the changing circumstances. The roles that actors 
play are, in this respect, much better conceptualized as resources in these actors struggle to become 
innovators rather than an implication of essential qualities of ‘innovative technology’. In this paper we 
maintain that a wide range of innovation processes are not shaped by innovation technology, rather, it 
is the other way around.  Technology is selected, and socially and practically constructed in order for 
companies to become innovators.  
This paper contributes to the theory of innovation. The practical application of our results ought to 
intrigue administrators and regulators of technological markets, policy-makers and politicians who 
increasingly aim to encourage industrial innovation to make sure that people have good jobs in the 
future, as well as the academic institutions who have designed education programs of innovation 
around the notion of extraordinary technological ideas. The conclusion of this paper is that this is 
perhaps not the most relevant perspective of innovation, since much innovation seems to be so very 
ordinary. 
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